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Abstract
In this paper, decisions regarding production in oil exporting countries are studied
by means of theoretical analysis and empirical investigation. Under the assump-
tions of exogenous oil prices and world oil demand, we are able to describe the
relationship between oil production levels and changes in the conditions in world
oil markets.
Intertemporal production decisions by a representative oil producer are modeled
by means of a partial equilibrium model. In this theoretical model, oil producers
are subject to exogenous shocks in world oil demand and prices. Oil companies can
change output levels only by incurring a xed cost. Results from the simulation
of this model show a strong relationship between oil production and changes in
world oil consumption. On the contrary, the eects of changes in real oil prices on
oil production decisions seem to be much lower.
Results from the simulation of the theoretical model are then empirically investi-
gated using time-series econometric techniques. The empirical evidence supports
the hypothesis that several oil producing countries are characterized by dierent
responses to changes in world oil demand and in real oil prices. For many countries
production rapidly adjusts to changes in consumption whereas responses of oil pro-
duction to innovations in real oil prices are found to be not statistically signicant.
In addition, when non-linearities in the relationship between exogenous variables
and output levels are allowed for, evidence of asymmetric eects of output levels
to shocks in demand levels and oil prices is found.
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21. Introduction and Related Literature
Developments in international oil markets are studied in various elds of
economics. In particular, the structure of world oil markets, as well as the
determinants of oil production levels, is examined by both theoretical and
empirical studies.
Many authors study the pattern of oil production, drawing conclusions on
the structure of international oil markets. For instance, in Grin [1] various
assumptions on the structure of world oil markets are tested. The validity
of four alternative models for OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Export-
ing Countries) production1 is examined using data on oil production for the
1983-1988 period. According to his results, the behavior of OPEC can be
described by means of a partial market-share model. Conversely, for non-
OPEC countries the hypothesis of a competitive model cannot be rejected
by the data.
The empirical results obtained by Grin [1] are examined, among others, by
Ramcharran [2], Kaufmann et al. [3] and Kaufmann et al. [4]. In particu-
lar, in Ramcharran [2], a supply function is estimated using data from 1973
to 1997. His study aims at determining how oil supply of both OPEC and
non-OPEC countries respond to oil price changes. Results suggest a negative
and signicant elasticity of production of OPEC countries to prices. On the
contrary, for many non-OPEC countries, positive and signicant coecients
are obtained.
Similarly, Gulen [5] concludes that the world oil market is dominated by a
cartel of oil producers.2 In fact, OPEC is able to aect prices by restricting
or expanding its output through a system of quotas assigned to each of its
members. On the other hand, there is a set of producing countries which
1That is, a) the competitive model; b) the cartel model; c) the target revenue model
and d) the property rights model.
2Nevertheless, the assumption that OPEC represents a \dominant producer" is rejected
by, among others, Alhajji and Huettner [6] and Smith [7]. In particular, the empirical
analysis of Alhajji and Huettner [6] emphasizes the role in the Organization of producing
countries of Saudi Arabia. This country is argued to act as the \swing producer" of the
Organization, varying its own output according to demand and supply shocks in order to
defend oil prices (see, also, Grin and Xiong [8] and Gately [9]).
3represent the \competitive fringe" of the market3.
Oil production changes since 1960 are examined by, among others, Gately
[9] and Pirog [11]. Gately [9] argues that, in spite of rapid increases in world
oil demand, since the late 1960s production by non-OPEC countries has not
changed signicantly, while, on the contrary, OPEC output increased notice-
ably. A likely explanation of this evidence lies in rising extraction costs faced
by oil producers.
After the rst oil shock, despite the quadrupling of oil prices (1974-1978),
production by non-OPEC countries remained stable. Viceversa, since 1976,
oil production in these countries expanded signicantly. New major discov-
eries in Mexico and a huge increase of production from new elds in the
North-Sea and Alaska allowed non-OPEC countries to increase oil output by
about 6 per cent between 1976 and 1983.
Dierently from Gately [9], Pirog [11] examines the role of national oil com-
panies in international oil markets. According to his analysis, rising world
oil demand and higher prices are among the main factors determining the
increase of production of oil companies since 2003.
In order to assess the responses of oil production to demand and price
changes, other authors propose to consider factors behind investment de-
cisions. For instance, Kesicki [12] shows that huge oil price increases often
lead to investments in oil exploration.4 As a consequence, past investments
are argued to be one of the main factors determining current oil production
levels.
As far as the responses of producing countries to the development of global
economy are concerned, De Santis [13] considers a computational general
equilibrium model to evaluate the eects of shocks to crude oil demand and
supply on prices and production levels for Saudi Arabia. De Santis [13] sug-
gests that, with the notable exception of this country, OPEC members tend
to adjust output levels to changes in the stance of world economy. On the
contrary, because of the high share of capital input in the production func-
tion, output levels of Saudi Arabia show a low degree of correlation with
3For an analysis of the stability of collusive behavior in the presence of producers which
take the price as exogenously given see, for instance, D'Aspremont et al. [10].
4According to the author, recent examples are represented by exploration in Alaska,
Siberia and the North Sea.
4demand shocks. Nevertheless, output levels adjust dierently to increases
and decreases in world oil demand. In fact, in the case of a negative shock to
demand, production levels are reduced rapidly to prevent prices from falling
too rapidly. On the contrary, output levels are not expanded accordingly
following a positive innovation on the demand side.
Numerical simulations of theoretical models (mainly, general equilibrium
models) suggest weak or negligible eects of demand and oil price shocks
on output also for non-OPEC countries. In particular, in Choucri et al. [14]
the domestic oil sector of a small oil producer such as Egypt is modeled by
means of a dynamic simulation model. The authors suggest that the possi-
bility to adjust production on the basis of developments in world oil prices
is constrained by the fact that, in Egypt, the oil sector often operates near
full capacity.
In Kaufmann [15] the eects of geological, economic and political factors
on total oil supply in the U.S. are examined. Econometric techniques are
employed to model extraction levels for the continental US. Results suggest
that, because of high extraction costs, negative oil price shocks adversely
aect production levels.
Finally, in its mid-term outlooks, the U.S. Department of Energy (see, for
instance, EIA [16])5 reports that oil production increases are projected to be
less than those in world oil demand.
In this paper we focus on small producing countries. The importance of these
countries in the world oil industry is rapidly increasing. According to data
from the Energy Information Administration between 1995 and 2010 pro-
duction levels of countries with a share of world oil production of not more
than 5 per cent have increased from 42 to approximately 56 million barrels
per day (B/d). During the same period, the number of countries producing
at least 200 thousand B/d has increased from 33 to 40.
Although the oil sector is important for these economies, changes in the
output levels are not able to aect signicantly prices in international oil
markets. In other words, these actors of the world oil market are assumed to
take prices as exogenously given. This assumption is explicitly considered,
inter alia by Choucri et al. [14], Pindyck [18] and [19]. In particular, Pindyck
describes how decisions on optimal production levels vary when dierent as-
5See, also, Horn [17].
5sumptions on marginal extraction costs are taken into consideration.
Our study concentrates on the economic determinants of oil production for
these countries. One of the purposes of this paper is to ll the gap in our un-
derstanding of the relationship between oil production levels, international oil
prices and world oil demand. Although previous research has already studied
the determinants of decisions on oil production levels for both OPEC and
non-OPEC countries (see, for instance, the article by Ramcharran [2]), to our
knowledge no study has previously tried to measure the degree of 
exibility
of decisions on oil production levels, that is the possibility by these nations
to rapidly modify production levels as conditions in the world oil markets
change. In addition, our paper contributes to the existing literature by of-
fering a competing alternative empirical framework to describe and test the
target revenue model for oil producers (see Grin [1]).
In order to establish how production levels respond to changes in world oil
demand and prices, results from both theoretical and empirical perspectives
are presented. The implications of our results for the theory of the struc-
ture of oil markets are also discussed. Our analysis also diers from the
study by Ramcharran because of the empirical methodology here adopted.
While Ramcharran [2] focuses on a simple supply function estimated by using
annual observations, we employ monthly data and, thus, more appropriate
AutoRegressive Distributed Lag or Error Correction Models.
In this paper, a partial equilibrium model is designed to describe decisions
over oil production levels for a representative small producing country. In
our model, oil producers are subject to exogenous shocks in world oil demand
and prices. Producing countries can react to these shocks by changing output
levels. However, they can adjust production only by incurring a xed cost.
Results from numerical simulation suggest that production levels tend to ad-
just rapidly to changes in the conditions of the world oil market. Moreover,
these responses seem to be strongly linked to the cost structure of the oil
producer. In addition, decisions on output levels are argued to be charac-
terized by dierent responses to changes in world oil demand and real oil
prices. While output levels react signicantly to increases in the world oil
demand, responses of oil producing countries to changes in real oil prices are
less statistically signicant. Finally, an upward sloping Kaplan-Meier hazard
function is shown to well describe oil production levels for many countries.
Predictions based on our theoretical model are, then, tested using empirical
analysis. An econometric framework is employed to describe data regarding
oil production levels for a signicant sample of oil producing countries. To
6check whether small and large oil producing countries have dierent sensi-
tivities to economic variables, our sample includes also the largest member
countries of OPEC (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Iran and Kuwait), the U.S. and Rus-
sia.
The statistical relationships between oil production, world oil demand and
real oil prices are examined by means of time-series econometric techniques.
The methodology here adopted allows us to analyze both short and long-
term dynamics of oil production as well as to introduce asymmetric eects
of exogenous variables. At this regard, our paper is dierent from the works
of Gulen [5] and Dibooglu and AlGudhea [20] who employ cointegration and
causality tests to test a dierent assumption (that is, output coordination
between OPEC member countries).
As a rst step of the analysis, the order of integration of these variables is
tested. The long- and short-run relationships existing between the series are
estimated by using both univariate and multivariate regression techniques.
Empirical evidence shows dierent responses to variations in world oil de-
mand and prices for the countries considered in the analysis. In general, the
eects of world oil demand changes on oil production levels are statistical not
dierent from zero. Conversely, the hypothesis of no eects from oil price
changes to oil output cannot be rejected.
Finally, the hypothesis of asymmetric eects of increases and decreases of
world oil demand and real oil prices on oil production levels is examined and
discussed. According to this textable assumption, adjustments of production
are less frequent in the presence of negative shocks because of downward
rigidities of production levels.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, our theoretical model is pre-
sented. In Section 2.1 the main assumptions of our framework are reported.
The procedure aimed at simulating the model is outlined in Section 2.2. Re-
sults of how oil production levels reacts to changes in world oil demand and
oil prices are examined in Section 2.3. In Section 3 the empirical framework
employed to assess the economic determinants of oil production is presented.
In particular, in Section 3.1 data regarding oil production for a signicant set
of producing countries are presented. Section 3.2 describes the time-series
econometric techniques employed to test the relationships between oil pro-
duction, total demand and real oil prices. Econometric results are examined
and discussed in Section 3.3. Section 4 concludes.
72. The Theoretical Model
2.1. The Model
We focus on the production decisions of an oil exporting country.6 Our
approach is to use a partial equilibrium model in which the preferences of
economic agents (oil producers) and production levels are determined endoge-
nously in equilibrium while oil prices and the pattern of world oil demand
are specied exogenously.
According to our framework, producers are assumed to behave as price-taking
prot maximizers. In addition, they set output levels without considering
other producers' behaviors. They are small producers in the sense that each
producer would adjust his production so as to obtain maximum net prots
regarding the oil price as xed beyond his control. Moreover, expansions of
world demand are important for these oil producers since they may embody
a better economic environment and, thus, the possibility of larger capital
in
ows by foreign investors.
At this regard, our model can be seen as a competing alternative description
of the target revenue model for oil producers (see Grin [1]).7; 8; 9
Single-period prots are given by:
t = qt (Pt   ct) (1)
where ct and qt denote marginal costs and eective oil production at time t
while Pt represents real oil prices.
Unit costs, ct, are a function of both the current level of production, qt and
of world oil demand, that is:
ct = c(qt; Dt) (2)
6For the purposes of this analysis, the terms oil company and (small) oil producer are
used interchangeably.
7Nevertheless, Kaufmann et al. [3] suggest that OPEC is able to aect market prices
by means of decisions over production quotas and capacity utilization.
8This assumption is also considered by, among others, Gilbert [21], Pindyck [19], Chou-
cri et al. [14] and Horn [17]. In particular, Choucri et al. [14] argue that, for an exporting
country like Egypt, \oil prices are clearly signicant exogenous".
9Notice also that, in many non-OPEC countries, oil is often extracted by a set of
international oil companies that take prices as exogenously given.
8Marginal costs are an increasing function of oil production, i.e. cqt > 0.10
In other words, we are assuming that, because of nite reserves, as produc-
tion increases and oil becomes more dicult to extract, unit costs increase
as well.11; 12 In addition, marginal costs are an inverse function of world oil
demand, Dt, i.e. cDt < 0.13
The following expression for unit costs is, for simplicity, employed for simu-
lation purposes:
ct = 


qt
Dt

(3)
where 
 and  are scale parameters. If we substitute the expression (3) for
ct into equation (1) we obtain that net prots can be expressed as:


t =
qt
Dt
 
Pt   


qt
Dt
!
here,
qt
Dt denotes relative oil production (i.e. the share of demand satised
by domestic production). 14
Since production is not fully 
exible, we assume that, in order to change
output, oil company's costs increase by a factor  .15 This implies that,
10cX denotes the rst derivative of function c(X) with respect to X.
11This assumption indirectly implies that the level of reserves and production costs are
related through an inverse relationship.
12Modelling marginal costs as a function of the rate of production is quite common. See,
for instance, Livernois and Uhler [22] and Moel [23].
13We are assuming that, as demand of oil increases, investments in research and devel-
opment lower unit costs of oil extraction. In fact, according to a \learning-curve" cost
decline on the production side, unit cost decreases as more and more experience is gained.
Marginal costs are modeled as function of experience by, among others, Spence [24].
14The ratio of production over total demand is considered on the basis of the assumption
that producers monitor their market share.
15This assumption implies that, in response to idiosyncratic shocks, economic agents
can only occasionally modify their decisions, see, for instance, Golosov and Lucas [25] and
Nakamura and Steinsson [26] who develop a model in which rms have to pay a \menu"
cost (that is, a xed cost) in order to modify nominal prices. This theoretical framework
9according to changes in world oil demand from Dt to c Dt, net (relative) prots
vary from 
t to b t, where:
b t =
8
> > <
> > :
qt
c Dt

Pt   


qt
c Dt

if production does not vary,
b qt
c Dt

Pt   


b qt
c Dt

  	 if production changes
(4)
where 	   
.16
Moreover, the natural logarithm of oil prices is assumed to evolve according
to a random walk process, that is:
lnPt = lnPt 1 + t
where lnXt denotes the natural logarithm of variable Xt.
Finally, the process for world oil demand (expressed in natural logarithms of
relative units) is given by:
lnDt =  + t
where lnDt = lnDt   lnDt 1. t and t are distributed according to
N(0;2
) and N(0;2
) processes, respectively. In other words, the series is
stationary around a trend.17
2.2. Solution of the Model
The theoretical model described in Section 2.1 is simulated for the actual
evolution of oil production values. In doing that, values have to be assigned
allows authors to explicitly introduce some form of price rigidities.
16Similarly, when real oil prices vary from Pt to b Pt, net prots change from 
t to b 
t
where:
b 
t =
qt
Dt

b Pt   


qt
Dt

if production remains stable or,
b 
t =
b qt
Dt

b Pt   


b qt
Dt

  	 if production changes from qt to b qt.
17These results are conrmed by simple regression analysis (see Section 2.2). Moreover,
data strongly reject the possibility to introduce the world oil demand as an additional
explanatory variable of oil prices. Similarly, in a regression of oil demand the coecient
on real oil prices is not statistically dierent from zero. These results are not shown to
save space but are available from the authors upon request
10to the parameters of the model (that is, , ,  , , 
, 2
 and , 2
).
According to Stockman and Tesar [27] the rate of time preference () is
set to be equal to 0.96. From simple regression analysis based on Energy
Information Administration data,18 parameters  and 2
 are estimated to be
equal to 0.00161 and 0.0084, respectively. On the basis of an econometric
analysis of oil prices behavior, a parameter value of 0.0923 is assigned to 2
.
Because of the unavailability of data and measurement errors, we are not
able to calibrate or estimate parameters ,   and 
 on the basis of empirical
data. On the contrary, the qualitative behavior of the model is discussed by
assigning dierent values to these parameters (see Section 2.3). In fact, the
world oil market is characterized by an heterogenous set of countries as far as
the structure of their costs is concerned. In response to demand and supply
conditions, countries that have lower extraction costs tend to adjust rapidly
production levels. Viceversa, producers with low levels of spare capacity face
more rigid extraction decisions.
The model is solved by value function iteration on the Bellman equation. Our
iteration procedure produces the value and policy functions (respectively,
V
  q
D; P

and
n  q
D
0 ; P 0
o
= h(
 q
D; P
	
)) after taking a random draw from
the distribution of  and  for each period. A procedure based on a grid of
values for qt and the exogenous variables, Dt and Pt, is then used until a
maximum for the prot function is found.
The model is simulated for 60,000 time periods. The rst 100 observations
are dropped in order not to consider a possibly sub-optimal starting point for
our oil producer. To make computation feasible, the state space for
 q
D; P
	
is assumed to be discrete. While the relative production, rq =
q
D lies in the
set:

rqmin; rqmin +
rqmax   rqmin
Nrprod   1
; rqmin + 2 
rqmax   rqmin
Nrprod   1
; :::; rqmax

the state space for P is given by:

Pmin; Pmin +
Pmax   Pmin
NP   1
; Pmin + 2 
Pmax   Pmin
NP   1
; :::; Pmax

18The period considered for this analysis extends from January 1994 to January 2010
for a total of 193 monthly observations.
11Values for rqmin, rqmax, Pmin and Pmax are chosen to avoid that the optimal
production level is higher (lower) with respect to the upper (lower) endpoint
of the state space of q.19
In Figures 1 and 2 the prot function is depicted together the value and
policy functions of our oil producer.
[INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE]
As it can be seen in Figure 1, prots are a strictly concave function with
respect to both relative production and oil prices. On the other hand, the
value function is given by:
V

qt 1
Dt
; Pt

= maxqt

t + EtV

qt
Dt+1
; Pt+1

and takes into account the decision by the oil producer to modify its pro-
duction level once conditions in the world oil market have changed. Figure 2
illustrates the particular pattern of the policy function for a representative oil
producer. As the Figure shows, if oil producers decide to vary their output
levels, prots do not change linearly (see equation 4).
2.3. Results
The properties of the simulated policy function are investigated to deter-
mine how oil production reacts to changes in demand and price levels. In this
Section, the relationship between eective production and relevant exognous
variable (i.e. world oil demand and prices) is examined using articial data.
A Kaplan-Meier plot of hazard function is, thus, computed and curves repre-
senting the probability of changes in production levels due to developments
in the exogenous variables plotted.
The Eects of Economic Variables on Oil Production Levels
The degree of correlation between production levels and the pattern of
world oil demand (respectively, oil prices) is reported in Table 1 (respectively,
Table 2). Since the oil market is characterized by countries with varying
19Values we chose for rqmin, rqmax, Pmin and Pmax are equal to -3, 0, 0, 0.35, respec-
tively. On the other hand, Nrprod and NP are equal to 200 and 40, respectively.
12extraction costs,20 statistics are obtained by considering dierent values as-
signed to parameters ,   and 
. As it can be observed from these Tables,
oil output displays a higher correlation with demand than with respect to
prices. In addition, although correlation decreases when rst-dierences of
the series are employed, it still remains particularly high. A strong correla-
tion of oil production with world demand behavior is also shown in the rst
panel of Figure 3. On the contrary, oil producing countries do not modify
signicantly output levels in response to oil price shocks (see Figure 3 second
panel).
[INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 AND FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
In order to obtain additional evidence on the importance of the economic
determinants of oil production levels, the following supply functions are es-
timated by employing simulated data:21
lnqt = 0 + 1 lnDt + 2 lnPt + t (5)
and
lnqt = e 0 + e 1lnDt + e 2lnPt +e t (6)
Here, lnYt = lnYt   lnYt 1 represents the log-rst dierence of variable
Yt = fqt; Dt; Ptg. As already outlined, qt, Dt and Pt denote, respectively,
the eective production, total world oil demand and the real price of oil at
time t. i (e i, i = 0; 1; 2), are the parameters to estimate while t (e t)
denotes the error term of the regressions.
Dierent assumptions on parameters  , 
 and  allow us to generate patterns
that can be used to describe output levels of oil producers with varying
extraction costs.
[INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE]
Results reported in Table 3 demonstrate that the elasticity of production to
world oil demand is positive and statistically dierent from zero. This result
20In fact, extraction costs depend on several factors, like for instance, the stock of oil
remaining and the features of oil reservoirs. See also Section 2.2.
21These equations are simply an extension of the models employed by Grin to test
several assumptions on the structure of the world oil market (see Grin [1]).
13is conrmed when variables are specied as log-rst dierences (see Table 4).
Viceversa, the relationship between oil production and oil prices is argued
to be much weaker. Estimates obtained by employing variables expressed as
log-levels (equation 5) are signicantly dierent from zero in six out of nine
cases. Nevertheless, when rst dierences of the series are used (equation
6), in no case results support statistically signicant eects of oil prices on
production levels.
On the Frequency of Oil Production Changes
As far as the frequency of production changes is concerned, in Tables 5 to
7 is reported the percentage of production increases and decreases together
with the average size of production changes. Even in this case, results are
shown as assumptions on the parameters of the model22 (that is, ,   and 
)
are changed.
[INSERT TABLES 5 TO 7 ABOUT HERE]
Results suggests that, as  increases, the frequency of production changes
decreases. The frequency of production changes tends to vary also with oil
producers' costs. As unit costs (denoted by parameter 
) or the multiplier
associated to costs ( ) increase, the frequency of decisions on production
levels decreases, that is, production becomes more rigid.
Tables 5 to 7 show that a similar relationship exists between the percentage of
production increases and the values assumed by the dierent parameters. In
particular, higher values of key parameters imply a larger fraction of upward
adjustments of production rates, i.e., a higher percentage of output increases
with respect to production decreases suggests that asymmetric eects prob-
ably aect output levels.23; 24
In addition, the possibility to change output levels seems to be characterized
by some asymmetries. In fact, producers tend to adjust output levels in the
22In the framework of our theoretical model, these parameters are employed to represent
the cost structure of our representative oil producing country.
23Of course, part of this eect is due to the positive trend that characterizes simulated
data of total world oil demand.
24The hypothesis of asymmetric eects of positive and negative changes in Dt and Pt is
tested by means of an empirical analysis in Section 3.
14presence of increasing world oil demand. On the contrary, according to theo-
retical evidence, when oil demand drops, producing countries tend to reduce
output more slowly. Finally, there is no evidence of a relationship between
the cost structure that characterizes oil producing countries and the average
size of production changes.
To characterize the probability of adjustments in production levels a hazard
model that relates the intensity of changes in output rates for a represen-
tative oil producer is specied. A function which is often used to denote
the probability that eective production will change at time t given that it
has remained stable for t periods is represented by the Kaplan-Meier hazard
function.25; 26 Figure 4 depicts the probability of adjustments in production
levels as a consequence of changes in conditions on the oil market.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
The Kaplan Meier plot of hazard function demonstrates that production
adjusts almost instantaneously to changes in the stance of world oil market.
However, the possibility that output levels are modied according to changes
in oil demand and prices depends on parameters representing the relative
cost of extraction of oil. In other words, responses of oil producing countries
shocks are aected by the relative importance of marginal costs. Moreover,
according to the cost of adjustments oil producing countries have to face
when they decide to change production levels, the hazard function is assumed
to take dierent forms. In the presence of low costs of adjustment, the
hazard function is upward slopping. For some countries, the probability
that production levels increase tends to be higher the longer the output has
remained stable.
25Let us denote the duration of a production increase by the random variable D.
The hazard of the decision by oil producers to increase output is given by (t) =
P (D = tjD  t).
26The possibility to use duration models in economics is discussed in, inter alia, Efron
[28] and Kiefer [29].
153. An Empirical Analysis of Oil Production
3.1. A Preliminary Analysis of Data
In this Section, according to the theoretical framework outlined earlier,
we concentrate on the eects of world oil demand and prices on output lev-
els of relevant oil producers. The data set underlying the empirical analysis
presented is constructed with monthly data on oil output levels for 19 coun-
tries: Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia,
Venezuela, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Malysia, Mexico,
Norway, Russia and the U.S.. Both the oil production and world oil demand
variables are expressed as thousand barrels per day and are taken from the
U.S. Department of Energy's database (Energy Information Administration).
Information on the sample period considered for each country is given in Ta-
ble 8.
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
As already outlined, the countries we focus on in this paper are relevant small
oil producers. Although oil production is important for the economy of these
countries, changes in their production levels have small eects on oil prices
in international markets. For these nations, adjustments in production levels
are dicult to implement, since they often involve relevant investments by
foreign companies. Supply functions are estimated also for major producing
nations (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, the U.S. and Russia). This allows
us to compare the responses by large producers to demand and price shocks
with producers which are assumed to behave independently.
Oil prices in national currencies are obtained by multiplying the nominal oil
price by the exchange rate of the US dollar for each country. The measure
of nominal oil prices is the average oil price from the International Monetary
Fund's database (International Financial Statistics). Real oil price levels
are calculated by de
ating the oil prices measured in national currencies us-
ing the in
ation indicator of the country. Both the exchange rate (average
monthly value for the period considered) and the in
ation indicator are taken
from the International Financial Statistics database.
Other explanatory variables are introduced to account for institutional and
geological factors that aect oil production. Results reported in this work
are obtained by including the State Fragility Index developed by the Center
16for Systemic Peace (see Marshall and Goldstone [30]) in all regressions.27 In
addition, a variable representing the amount of proven oil reserves in each
country is included in each equation. All data on oil reserves are from the
British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy (2010).
Table 9 presents some descriptive gures of the oil production variable (con-
sidered in levels) for the countries examined in the analysis. In Table 10
the same statistics are computed using the production expressed in log rst-
dierence form. The rst moments of the distribution (mean, standard devi-
ation, skewness and kurtosis) of oil production are reported in columns two
to ve of the tables. The sixth column shows the degree of correlation be-
tween oil production and demand. The relationship between oil production
and real oil prices is reported in column seven.28
[INSERT TABLES 9 AND 10 ABOUT HERE]
According to Tables 9 and 10, production levels of OPEC countries show, on
average, a higher degree of correlation with world oil demand. This result
is probably due to larger oil reserves and lower extraction costs. Production
levels of Algeria are the most correlated with demand. On the contrary,
output levels from Angola and Ecuador show lower levels of correlation. As
far as non-OPEC countries are considered, results suggest a high correlation
between production levels and oil demand for the U.S., Norway and Rus-
sia. Finally, the correlation between production and oil prices tends to be
particularly low for all countries considered in the present study.
3.2. Methodology
In this paper we focus on the economic determinants of output levels by
oil producing countries. Our purpose is to answer to this question: how do
27The State Fragility Index scores countries according to their capacity to respond eec-
tively to challenges and crises and, consequently, promote economic development. There-
fore, to construct this index, performance dimensions on security, political, economic, and
social issues are taken into account. The ability of governments to manage con
ict by
maintaining social cohesion is considered together with an evaluation of their eorts to
deliver essential services to the population.
28The relationship between oil production for each country and other nations' output
levels is also examined. Results from statistical analysis conrm that the degree of corre-
lation of production levels of non-OPEC countries is particularly low. Statistics are not
reported to save space but are available upon request.
17oil production responds to changes in the stance of world oil markets? The
empirical methodology examined in the present study is based upon time-
series econometric techniques. In particular, for each country, the order of
integration and cointegration of the variables is examined and a dynamic
econometric model is estimated on the basis of the following algorithm.29
1. The order of integration of oil production and real oil prices for country
i (i = 1;:::; 19) is consided.30
(a) if both series are stationary (that is, they are both I(0)) the fol-
lowing equation is estimated:
lnqi;t = i +
Pp
k=1 i;k lnqi;t k +
Pp
j=0 
i;jlnDt j +
+
Pp
s=0 #i;s lnPi;t s +  i  Zi;t + i;t (7)
where qi;t is total production for country i at time t, Dt and Pi;t
denote, respectively, total world oil demand and the real price of
oil. Zi;t represent other explanatory variables (polity index and oil
reserves). Parameters i, i;k (k = 1;:::; p), 
i;j (j = 0; 1;:::; p),
#i;s and  i (s = 0; 1;:::; p) represent the coecients to estimate
while i;t denotes the error term of the regression. All variables
considered are expressed in natural logarithms.
(b) if the production level is I(0) while the price level is I(1), the
equation (8) is estimated:
lnqi;t = i +
Pp
k=1 i;k lnqi;t k +
Pp
j=0 
i;jlnDt j +
+
Pp
s=0 #i;slnPi;t s +  i  Zi;t + i;t (8)
29It is worth noticing that our analysis does not aim at giving a full description of factors
that may aect output levels in oil producing countries. Other factors (such as the degree of
political instability, the measure of openness of the economy to foreign investments, future
expectations on extraction costs, etc.) are able to in
uence oil production. Neverthess,
in this paper we concentrate on the eects that changes in world oil demand and prices
have on output levels. The possibility to extend our analysis in order to include these
exogenous variables in a more complete model of oil production is left as a topic for future
research.
30Results from unit root tests suggest that world oil demand is not stationary (i.e.,
I(1)).
18(c) if only the price level is I(0), the expression to estimate takes the
following form:
lnqi;t = i +
Pp
k=1 i;klnqi;t k +
Pp
j=0 
i;jlnDt j +
+
Pp
s=0 #i;s lnPi;t s +  i  Zi;t + i;t (9)
(d) if both series are integrated then step 2 has to be considered;
2. Tests for the presence of cointegration are implemented. Let us consider
the following equation:
lnqi;t = ai;0 + ai;1 lnDt + ai;2 lnPi;t + Zi;t + i;t (10)
where ai;w between(w = 0; 1; 2) and i;t denote parameters to esti-
mate and the error term, respectively. It is worth noticing that OLS
regressions of world oil production on total demand and prices yield
superconsistent estimates of long-run coecients. This equation rep-
resents the long-run equilibrium relationship between oil production,
world oil demand and oil prices. If the long-run disequilibrium world
oil production, world oil production and prices (i;t) follows a stationary
process, it can be said that the three series are cointegrated. According
to the results on the stationarity of i;t, one of the following two cases
has to be considered.
(a) If series are not cointegrated (that is, the relationship representing
the long-run equilibrium between the series is non-stationary), the
following AutoRegressive Distributed Lag model (ARDL(p)) of
order p is estimated:
lnqi;t = i +
Pp
k=1 i;klnqi;t k +
Pp
j=0 
i;jlnDt j +
+
Pp
s=0 #i;slnPi;t s +  i  Zi;t + i;t (11)
(b) if oil production is cointegrated with world oil demand and oil
prices, the specication to estimate is represented by an Error
Correction Model (ECM):
lnqi;t = i +
Pp
k=1 i;klnqi;t k +
Pp
j=0 
i;jlnDt j +
+
Pp
s=0 #i;slnPi;t s + iECTi;t 1 +  i  Zi;t + i;t (12)
here i represents the long-run equilibrium adjustment parameter
while ECTi;t 1 = i;t 1 denotes the long-run equilibrium relation-
ship between oil production, world oil demand and crude oil prices.
19In this paper, the relationship between oil production, world oil demand and
prices is investigated country-by-country and at a system level using dynamic
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) techniques. In fact, as proposed by
Zellner (Zellner [31] and Zellner [32])), under certain conditions,31 regression
coecient estimators obtained by employing generalized least squares to a
system of equations are asymptotically more ecient than those that result
from estimating single equations by means of least squares techniques. The
system of equations, to estimate by means of dynamic SUR techniques, is
given by:
I if both the production level and the price level are I(1)
lnqt =  +
Pp
k=1 klnqt k +
Pp
j=0 
jlnDt j +
+
Pp
s=0 #slnPt s + D    ECTt 1 +    Zt + t (13)
where qt = [q1;t; q2;t; :::; qN1;t]
0, Pt = [P1;t; P2;t; :::; PN1;t]
0, ECTt =
[ECT1;t; ECT2;t; :::; ECTN1;t]
0 and Zt = [Z1;t; Z2;t; :::; ZN1;t]
0, are,
respectively, the endogenous variable and the exogenous regressors,  =
[1; 2; :::; N1]
0, k = [1;k; 2;k; :::; N1;k]
0, #s = [#1;s; #2;s; :::; #N1;s]
0,
 = [1; 2; :::; N1]
0, and 
j = [
1;j; 
2;j; :::; 
N1;j]
0, are parameters
to estimate, D is a (N1  1)32 vector whose values are equal to one if
there exists a long-run relationship between oil production and the ex-
planatory variables and zero otherwise and t = f1;t; 2;t; :::; N1;tg is
the vector of residuals.
II if the production level is I(0) while the price level is I(1).
lnqt =  +
Pp
k=1 k lnqt k +
Pp
j=0 
jlnDt j +
+
Pp
s=0 #slnPt s +    Zt + t (14)
3.3. Results
Introduction
Results obtained from unit root tests for relevant variables considered in
the present study are reported in Tables 11 to 12. The problem of testing the
31Analysis by Zellner and Huang [33] suggests that a large gain in eciency can be
obtained when contemporaneous disturbance terms in dierent equations are correlated
and variables in dierent equations are not highly correlated.
32N1 is the number of countries considered.
20null hypothesis of non-stationarity versus stationarity is solved by employing
the Augmented Dickey Fuller test (see Dickey and Fuller [34]). The test
equation is:
lnZi;t = 

i;0 + 

i;1  trend + 

i;2lnZi;t 1 +
p X
j=1
i;jlnZi;t j + ui;t (15)
where Zi;t and ui;t are the variable being tested (Zi;t = fqi;t;Pi;tg) and the
residuals of the regression, respectively. The test is implemented by deter-
mining the t-statistic of b 
i;2 and comparing the value of this statistic with
critical values computed by MacKinnon [35].33
[INSERT TABLES 11 AND 12 ABOUT HERE]
Results suggest that, in general, oil production is a variable integrated of
order one (i.e., I(1)). Nevertheless, production levels of Nigeria, Venezuela,
Brazil, Canada and the U.S. seem to be stationary around a trend. With the
relevant exception of Angola, tests of unit root suggest that real oil prices
are not stationary.
Results of tests on the stationarity of the residuals obtained from the esti-
mation of long-run relationships between oil production, world oil demand
and real oil prices are presented in Table 13. At this purpose, critical values
for the ADF tests are based upon Davidson and MacKinnon [38].
[INSERT TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE]
Stationarity tests implemented on the residuals of long-run relationship sug-
gest that, for several countries34, there exists a cointegrating relationship
between oil production, world oil demand and oil prices.
33If the trend is not signicant, equation (15) is re-estimated without trend (1  0).
Following Lee and Strazicich [36], the number of lags to include in the regression is chosen
by minimizing the Schwarz-Bayesian Information Criterion. For an analysis of the testing
procedure adopted in this paper, see Dolado et al. [37].
34Namely, Ecuador, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway and
Russia.
21The Eects of Economic Variables on Oil Production Levels
Equations representing the short-run dynamics of oil production decisions
are estimated by means of least squares techniques and results shown in Ta-
bles 14 to 16.35; 36 Table 17 shows the statistical signicance of the overall
impact of world oil demand and prices on total output. Simple statistical
tests of the hypothesis that all regression coecients associated with exoge-
nous variables are zero are reported together with the sign of the relationship
between oil production and total demand (or real oil prices). Long-run co-
ecients i;D =

i;1+
i;2+:::+
i;p
1 i;1 i;2 ::: i;p and i;Pi =
#i;1+#i;2+:::+#i;p
1 i;1 i;2 ::: i;p are presented
only for countries which are characterized by a statistically meaningful rela-
tionship between the two variables.
Estimation of equations (7) to (12) yields important insights as far as the rela-
tionship between production decisions and developments in world oil market
is concerned. In fact, many countries display a signicant relationship be-
tween their production levels and world oil demand. This is particularly true
for OPEC member countries like Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and
Venezuela. This relationship is conrmed for many non-OPEC countries. In
particular, a strong positive relationship between oil production and world
oil demand exists for Mexico, Norway, Russia and the U.S.. An explanation
for this evidence lies in the fact that, in presence of economic growth and,
consequently, increasing domestic oil demand, these countries have incentives
to expand their production.
Table 17 shows that, for countries like Angola, Libya, Brazil and Canada,
coecients associated to world oil demand are not statistically dierent from
zero. Oil production of these countries tends to adjust more slowly to de-
mand changes. This fact is probably due to a lower spare capacity and,
consequently, a lack of 
exibility in domestic oil production.
Finally, the relationship between oil production and oil prices is much weaker.
Many OPEC nations are characterized by an elasticity to price changes not
35These tables provide coecients estimates with standard errors. Statistics which
describe the goodness of t of regressions are also reported.
36The preferred number of lags of ARDL and EC Models is selected by examining the
autocorrelations of the estimated residuals. The process undertaken to obtain the optimum
lag length is to increase the number of lags up to the point where the residuals are not
serially correlated.
22statistically dierent from zero. Noticeable exceptions are represented by
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In these countries, in fact, oil tends to increase
in presence of positive oil price shocks. A likely explanation is that, these
oil producers may try to coordinate OPEC behavior in an attempt to hold
down the pressures on prices.37 However, if non-OPEC countries are taken
into account, in no case, the oil production tends to respond signicantly to
real oil price shocks.38
[INSERT TABLES 14 TO 17 ABOUT HERE]
When dynamic SUR techniques are employed, two dierent systems of equa-
tions are estimated depending on the properties of the time series. While
in the rst system the endogenous variable is represented by the rst dier-
ences of oil production, in the second system the natural logarithm of output
levels is considered as the dependent variable. For each system of equations,
the number of lags is selected by examining the residual autocorrelations.
The multivariate portmanteau test (based on the Box-Pierce/Ljung-Box Q-
statistics) is used to test whether the null of no residual correlation is rejected
by the data (see Tables 18 and 19). Adjusted Q statistics are generally con-
sistent with the absence of serial correlation in the residuals when a number
of lags equal to one and three is selected for the rst and second group of
countries, respectively.
Table 20 gives F statistics for the test of the joint signicance of coecients
of the contemporaneous and lagged values of variables Dt and Pit.39
Estimates derived by employing dynamic SUR techniques yield similar in-
sights with regard to the important eects that demand changes have on
oil production levels. Results obtained from the estimation of systems (13)
and (14) conrm that the impact of oil prices on output is limited to a few
37Remember that these countries are characterized by high levels of spare capacity.
38This relationship is valid only for Canada, Mexico and Norway but only at a 10 per
cent signicance level.
39According to these tests, the null hypothesis H0 : 
i;1 = 
i;2 = ::: = 
i;p = 0
(respectively, H0 : #i;1 = #i;2 = ::: = #i;p = 0) is considered in order to evaluate the joint
signicance of parameters on world oil demand (resp., real oil prices).
23countries (namely, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Norway).40
[INSERT TABLES 18 TO 20 ABOUT HERE]
Finally, tests are introduced to examine the hypothesis of asymmetric re-
sponses as indicated by dierent coecients on positive and negative changes
in Dt and Pi;t. In fact, for instance, Kaufmann et al. [4] demonstrate that,
among the OPEC countries, short-run eects of price changes on production
tend to be asymmetric.41 The obvious motivation for distinguishing between
positive and negative demand (respectively, price) changes is due to the as-
sumption that the curve is upward slowing when demand is (resp. prices are)
above the expected demand (resp. price) level but completely vertical when
demand is (resp. prices are) below that level.
The Asymmetric Eects on Oil Production of World Oil Demand and Price
Changes
The modied versions of equations (8) to (12) employed in order to test
the assumption of asymmetric eects are given in Table 21. In this Table,
lnY
+
t j and lnY
( )
t j denote, respectively, increases and decreases of vari-
able Yt j (j = 1; 2;:::;p) where Yt = fDt;Pi;tg. Similarly, ECT
(+)
i;t 1 (respec-
tively, ECT
( )
i;t 1) indicates the positive (respectively, negative) component of
the error correction term.
[INSERT TABLE 21 ABOUT HERE]
Tables 22 to 27 examine whether (positive or negative) shocks to demand and
prices have symmetric eects on oil production. Equations are estimated by
adopting both univariate and multivariate SUR techniques.42
40The regression analysis also suggests that oil production in countries like Russia,
Colombia, Venezuela and Libya is aected also by the political environment. To save
space, these results are not presented here but they are available upon request from the
authors.
41According to these authors, for instance, in Saudi Arabia \price reductions lower
production faster than price increases raise production".
42The test procedure presented here is similar to those employed, among others, by
Galeotti et al. [39] and Grasso and Manera [40]. Their analysis are, however, concerned
with the asymmetric relationship between gasoline and crude oil prices.
24Table 22 (resp. Table 23) shows Wald statistics for the hypothesis that the
coecients on positive and negative oil demand (resp. oil price) changes are
jointly not statistically dierent from zero. In order to gain further insights
on asymmetric eects of demand and prices, the results of formal statistical
tests for the equality of the eects of positive and negative shocks to demand
and prices are presented. Table 24 presents Wald statistics from testing the
null hypothesis that the sum of the coecients on positive changes equals
the sum of the coecients on negative changes. Similarly, Tables 25 to 27
show results when dynamic SUR techniques are employed to test asymmetric
eects of demand and oil prices on oil production levels.
[INSERT TABLES 22 TO 27 ABOUT HERE]
Results suggest that, for Saudi Arabia and Norway, responses of national
output are stronger in the presence of increases in demand levels. Using Wald
test statistics, the hypothesis that the coecients on positive changes in world
oil demand equal those on negative changes is rejected at any signicance
level only for the former country. In Colombia responses of oil production are
found to respond signicantly to increases in world oil demand whereas, the
relationship between oil production changes and declines in demand is not
statistically meaningful. With regard to the eects of real oil price changes,
Table 24 shows that, for Libya, output levels respond in a non-linear way to
oil price changes. For this country, the null hypothesis of symmetric eects is
rejected by the data when both least squares and SUR techniques are used.
Finally, Table 28 (and Table 29 when dynamic SUR models are employed)
shows that for Ecuador, Iran, Malaysia and Norway, there exist nonlinear
responses of oil production levels to disequilibrium in the supply function as
represented by the long-run relationship (equation 10).
[INSERT TABLES 28 TO 29 ABOUT HERE]
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper focuses on the decisions on production levels faced by small
exporting countries. The importance in the world oil industry of these mar-
ket players is, in fact, rapidly growing. A relatively large number of small
oil producers has recently recorded a relevant increase in revenues from oil
extraction. Between 1995 and 2010, production levels of countries with pro-
duction levels of not more than 5 per cent of world oil output have increased
25from 59.4 to 65.1 per cent of world oil output.
This paper aims at studying the behavior of small oil producers under ex-
ogeneity assumptions on variables that describe the economic conditions in
the world oil market. Because of the size of their oil reserves, these actors
of the world oil market are characterized by relatively low production levels.
Consequently, they are assumed to take prices as exogenously given. In many
countries the productivity of the oil sector has recently risen. However, these
producing countries are still not able to aect world oil prices by modifying
production levels.
In particular, our analysis aims at establishing how oil production levels react
to changes in world oil demand and real prices. Although previous research
has already considered the determinants of decisions on oil production levels,
relatively few studies have examined the degree of 
exibility of decisions on
oil production levels (that is, the possibility by both OPEC and non-OPEC
countries to rapidly modify production levels as conditions in the world oil
markets change). This paper tries to ll the gap in our understanding of
the relationship between oil production levels, world oil demand and real oil
prices. At this purpose, both theoretical analysis and empirical investigation
are designed to describe the decisions on production levels of these actors
of the world oil market. The implications of our results with regard to the
eects on the overall structure of the markets are, then, discussed.
Oil production adjustments are investigated through a partial equilibrium
model. In this model, oil companies are subject to exogenous shocks in
world oil demand and prices. Oil producers can change output levels only
by incurring a xed cost. Results from the simulation of this theoretical
model demonstrate that decisions on output levels depend on factors that
aect the cost structure of oil producers. As a consequence, output reacts
signicantly to changes in the stance of international oil markets. However,
dierent responses to exogenous variables are argued to characterize produc-
tion levels. In fact, on the one hand, the pattern of simulated series suggests
that changes in the world oil demand aect signicantly output. On the
contrary, responses of oil exporting countries to oil price shocks are much
weaker. Finally, output levels for a representative oil producing country are
well described by an upward sloping Kaplan-Meier hazard function.
Empirical models based on time-series econometric techniques are introduced
to describe data regarding output levels for a signicant sample of oil produc-
ers. Results from the estimation of AutoRegressive Distributive Lag (ARDL)
and, when cointegration is present, Error Correction (EC) models suggest
26that production levels tend to adjust signicantly to variations in total oil
demand. On the contrary, the hypothesis of no eects of price changes on oil
output is not rejected by the data. This latter result underlines the possibil-
ity that, in many small oil producing countries, the oil sector is characterized
by low levels of spare capacity. As a consequence, adjustments of production
levels are constrained and output reaction to oil price changes is weaker.
Finally, the hypothesis of asymmetric eects of increases and decreases of
exogenous variables on oil production levels is examined and discussed. Em-
pirical evidence illustrates that, for some countries (namely, Saudi Arabia,
Norway and Colombia), positive oil demand shocks have larger eects than
negative demand shocks.
An important direction for future research is to extend the theoretical and
empirical models presented in this paper. For instance, additional research is
required to investigate the interactions between production quotas adopted
by OPEC and world oil prices. Finally, further empirical research should be
addressed in order to take into account how political and economic institu-
tions aect investments and production in oil exporting countries.
27Figure 1: Prot function of a representative oil producing country
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28Figure 2: Value and policy function
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  29Figure 3: Responses of oil production to changes in the world oil market  
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30Figure 4: Hazard function of oil production changes (simulated data)
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31Table 1: Correlation between production levels and world oil demand. Simulation data.
i Levels First Dierences
2.5 79.1% 17.9%
3 79.9% 1.4%
3.5 95.9% 20.0%

 Levels First Dierences
0.4 79.8% 36.8%
0.5 95.3% 26.9%
0.6 88.4% 15.1%
  Levels First Dierences
0.025 92.2% 20.1%
0.03 92.7% 25.3%
0.035 22.7% 16.2%
Table 2: Correlation between production levels and oil prices. Simulation data.
i Levels First Dierences
2.5 41.9% 1.2%
3 50.1% -14.2%
3.5 1.4% -10.0%

 Levels First Dierences
0.4 26.9% -8.6%
0.5 23.9% 9.6%
0.6 -58.2% -16.0%
  Levels First Dierences
0.025 -60.7% 7.4%
0.03 21.5% 1.3%
0.035 14.2% -3.6%
32Table 3: Statistical relationship between production levels, world oil demand and oil prices.
Simulated data - Levels.
Demand Prices
i Coe. Std. Error Coe. Std. Error
2.5 1.114 0.071 *** 0.004 0.008
3 0.385 0.027 *** 0.021 0.006 ***
3.5 0.972 0.021 *** 0.004 0.010

 Coe. Std. Error Coe. Std. Error
0.4 1.016 0.056 *** -0.017 0.007
0.5 0.969 0.021 *** 0.029 0.007 ***
0.6 1.121 0.049 *** 0.113 0.015 ***
  Coe. Std. Error Coe. Std. Error
0.025 1.548 0.075 *** 0.042 0.006 ***
0.03 1.078 0.030 *** 0.016 0.006 ***
0.035 0.281 0.085 *** 0.019 0.010 *
Notes.
Reported are the results obtained by estimating the following model
lnqt = 0 + 1 lnDt + 2 lnPt + t on the basis of simulated data.
*** (**, *) denote rejection of the null pothesis that coecients b 1
and b 2 are statistically not dierent from zero at 1% (5%, 10%)
signicance level.
33Table 4: Statistical relationship between production levels, world oil demand and oil prices.
Simulated data - First Dierences.
Demand Prices
i Coe. Std. Error Coe. Std. Error
2.5 0.410 0.164 *** 0.003 0.015
3 0.002 0.068 -0.028 0.014
3.5 0.391 0.149 *** -0.014 0.014

 Coe. Std. Error Coe. Std. Error
0.4 0.926 0.169 *** -0.023 0.017
0.5 0.608 0.160 *** 0.018 0.016
0.6 0.140 0.069 ** -0.015 0.007
  Coe. Std. Error Coe. Std. Error
0.025 0.394 0.134 *** 0.016 0.013
0.03 0.561 0.155 *** 0.005 0.015
0.04 0.36 0.16 ** -0.009 0.019
Notes.
Reported are the results obtained by estimating the following model
lnqt = 0 + 1lnDt + 2lnPt + t using simulated data.
*** (**, *) denote rejection of the null pothesis that the coecients
b 1 and b 2 are statistically not dierent from zero at 1% (5%, 10%)
signicance level.
34Table 5: Simulation results. Statistics on oil production changes. Sensitivity to .
 Frequency Fraction up Fraction down Average size
2.75 8.371 60.992% 40.008 % 7.100
3.00 7.808 62.489% 37.511 % 7.123
3.25 7.664 65.615 % 34.385 % 6.574
Notes.
Frequency and fraction up (resp. down) denote the average frequency of oil
production changes expressed in months and the fraction of oil production
increases (resp. decreases), respectively. Average size denotes the mean size
of oil production changes.
Table 6: Simulation results. Statistics on oil production changes. Sensitivity to 
.

 Frequency Fraction up Fraction down Average size
0.4 9.583 58.810% 41.190% 6.851
0.5 7.765 62.503% 37.497% 7.102
0.6 6.948 64.060% 35.940% 6.658
Notes.
See notes to Table 5.
35Table 7: Simulation results. Statistics on oil production changes. Sensitivity to  .
  Frequency Fraction up Fraction down Average size
0.025 8.394 60.723% 39.277% 7.054
0.03 7.766 62.052% 37.948% 7.163
0.035 7.386 62.740 % 37.260% 7.214
Notes.
See notes to Table 5.
Table 8: Countries considered in the empirical analysis
Country Start Date End Date N. Observations
Algeria January 1995 December 2009 180
Angola November 1995 December 2009 170
Ecuador January 1995 December 2009 180
Iran January 1995 December 2009 180
Kuwait January 1995 February 2009 170
Libya January 2001 November 2009 107
Nigeria January 1995 October 2009 178
Saudi Arabia January 1995 December 2009 180
Venezuela January 1995 December 2009 180
Brazil January 1996 December 2009 168
Canada January 1995 December 2009 180
Colombia January 1995 December 2009 180
Egypt January 1995 January 2009 169
Indonesia January 1995 December 2009 180
Malaysia January 1995 December 2009 180
Mexico January 1995 December 2009 180
Norway January 1995 December 2009 180
Russia January 1998 December 2009 144
U.S. January 1995 December 2009 180
36Table 9: Oil production. Descriptive statistics, levels.
Correlation with:
Country Mean St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis a) demand b) prices
Algeria 1718.7 336.2 0.25 -1.71 94.3% 87.9%
Angola 1058.2 478.6 0.99 -0.47 83.8% 21.9%
Ecuador 438.7 65.4 0.41 -1.45 85.2% -36.1%
Iran 3875.5 240.1 0.11 -1.24 81.8% 73.3%
Kuwait 2317.7 248.3 0.40 -1.32 84.7% 86.1%
Libya 1564.3 177.4 0.67 -1.14 83.4% 88.4%
Nigeria 2210.5 190.5 0.40 0.53 74.1% 56.1%
Saudi Arabia 9745.5 752.1 0.45 -0.94 78.1% 75.7%
Venezuela 2971.1 398.1 -1.46 7.15 -38.3% -45.8%
Brazil 1673.4 529.2 0.08 -1.11 94.0% 82.2%
Canada 2904.6 347.3 0.04 -1.15 93.6% 78.4%
Colombia 619.1 94.7 0.61 0.03 -14.2% -36.4%
Egypt 769.9 108.9 0.03 -1.21 -93.2% -78.4%
Indonesia 1354.2 233.3 -0.16 -1.64 -91.2% -81.1%
Malaysia 758.2 54.9 0.27 -0.64 8.6% -22.0%
Mexico 3452.1 277.7 -0.37 0.32 35.7% -7.9%
Norway 3007.2 369.42 -0.50 -0.80 -34.5% -55.2%
Russia 7831.0 1590.2 0.17 -1.74 92.6% 69.4%
U.S. 8950.7 452.2 -1.04 2.31 -71.5% -58.4%
37Table 10: Oil production. Descriptive statistics, log-rst dierences.
Correlation with:
Country Mean St. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis a) demand b) prices
Algeria 0.26% 1.10% 0.83 4.02 18.5% -7.85%
Angola 0.74% 2.68% 0.83 4.37 2.2% -0.72%
Ecuador 0.14% 3.72% 0.78 10.94 5.4% 0.30%
Iran 0.07% 2.17% -0.35 2.73 25.9% -0.76%
Kuwait 0.10% 1.99% -0.71 11.63 24.0% -12.50%
Libya 0.12% 1.12% -0.15 5.37 21.6% -7.43%
Nigeria 0.09% 4.10% -0.18 6.17 16.4% 3.18%
Saudi Arabia 0.05% 1.95% 0.60 8.12 50.5% 5.92%
Venezuela -0.09% 11.22% -2.85 66.75 28.5% -12.32%
Brazil 0.56% 5.94% -0.04 57.40 -6.4% -4.74%
Canada 0.20% 2.79% 0.15 0.03 15.4% -0.11%
Colombia 0.25% 4.13% -0.76 9.44 -3.7% 4.30%
Egypt -0.23% 1.96% -1.89 9.58 -3.5% 9.93%
Indonesia -0.23% 1.09% 0.51 4.27 3.1% -5.85%
Malaysia 0.01% 2.66% -0.10 4.26 -3.0% -1.08%
Mexico -0.03% 4.37% -1.18 29.45 15.1% 6.01%
Norway -0.05% 6.34% -0.12 1.16 43.9% -10.43%
Russia 0.21% 1.00% -0.58 2.03 17.1% 7.67%
U.S. -0.01% 2.82% -2.06 22.88 28.5% -3.23%
38Table 11: Results of unit root tests. Production and world oil demand.
Levels First Dierences
Country N. Lags T-Stat. Prob. N. Lags T-Stat. Prob.
Algeria 0 -0.29 0.922 0 -11.609 0.000***
Angola 1t -1.58 0.797 0 -11.718 0.000 ***
Ecuador 1 -1.71 0.423 0 -17.780 0.000***
Iran 1t -2.93 0.156 0 -18.107 0.000***
Kuwait 1t -2.45 0.353 0 -11.584 0.000***
Libya 0 -0.41 0.905 0 -11.965 0.000***
Nigeria 0t -4.49 0.002*** 1 -13.398 0.000***
Saudi Arabia 1 -2.21 0.205 0 -11.694 0.000***
Venezuela 4t -4.03 0.009*** 3 -10.626 0.000***
Brazil 1t -4.63 0.001*** 2 -11.838 0.000***
Canada 0t -5.62 0.000*** 1 -13.815 0.000***
Colombia 0 -2.11 0.241 0 -15.722 0.000***
Egypt 0 -0.24 0.930 0 -14.269 0.000***
Indonesia 0t -2.40 0.378 0 -14.974 0.000***
Malaysia 0 -2.68 0.080* 0 -14.815 0.000***
Mexico 2 -1.70 0.429 2 -12.251 0.000***
Norway 12t -1.63 0.778 11t -5.927 0.000***
Russia 0t -2.97 0.144 0 -15.954 0.000***
U.S. 0t -5.11 0.000*** 1 -13.637 0.000***
Oil Demand 0t -2.86 0.178 1 -12.220 0.000***
Notes.
Presented are the t-values of c 
i;2 in the following equations:
lnZi;t = 
i;0 + 
i;1  trend + 
i;2 lnZi;t 1 +
Pp
j=1 i;jlnZi;t j + ui;t (variables in levels)
2 lnZi;t = 
i;0 + 
i;1  trend + 
i;2 lnZi;t 1 +
Pp
j=1 i;j2 lnZi;t j + ui;t (variables in
log-rst dierences). The procedure proposed by Dolado et al. [37] is adopted. t denotes
that a linear trend is included in the above equations. The number of lags to include in the
regressions is chosen by minimizing the Schwarz-Bayesian Information Criterion. *** (**, *)
denote that the null hypothesis H0 : c 
i;2 = 0 is rejected given 1% (5%, 10%) signicance
levels. Critical values computed by MacKinnon [35] are employed.
39Table 12: Results of unit root tests. Real oil prices.
Levels First Dierences
Country N. Lags T-Stat. Prob. N. Lags T-Stat. Prob.
Algeria 1t -3.174 0.093* 0 -10.881 0.000***
Angola 2 -3.310 0.016** 0 -11.213 0.000***
Ecuador 1 -1.781 0.389 0 -10.447 0.000***
Iran 0t -2.201 0.486 0 -12.218 0.000***
Kuwait 1t -2.393 0.382 0 -10.407 0.000***
Libya 1 -2.208 0.205 0 -8.339 0.000***
Nigeria 0t -2.229 0.471 0 -13.428 0.000***
Saudi Arabia 1t -2.850 0.181 0 -10.691 0.000***
Venezuela 1 -1.936 0.316 0 -10.379 0.000***
Brazil 1 -1.682 0.439 0 -10.788 0.000***
Canada 1t -3.278 0.073* 0 -11.447 0.000***
Colombia 1t -2.898 0.166 0 -11.478 0.000***
Egypt 1t -2.469 0.343 0 -10.370 0.000***
Indonesia 0 -2.979 0.141 0 -12.317 0.000***
Malaysia 1t -3.427 0.051* 0 -11.060 0.000***
Mexico 1t -2.761 0.214 0 -11.391 0.000***
Norway 1t -3.025 0.128 0 -11.418 0.000***
Russia 1t -2.781 0.207 0 -11.083 0.000***
U.S. 1t -2.825 0.190 0 -10.828 0.000***
Notes.
See notes to Table 11.
40Table 13: Stationary analysis of residuals of long-run relationship.
Country N. Lags T-Stat.
Algeria 3 -2.449
Ecuador 0 -3.405 ***
Iran 2 -3.793 **
Kuwait 0 -4.904 ***
Libya 0 -3.392 *
Saudi Arabia 5 -3.959 **
Colombia 1 -3.241
Egypt 0 -3.813 **
Indonesia 2 -2.822
Malaysia 2 -3.677 **
Mexico 0 -4.970 ***
Norway 1 -5.673 ***
Russia 0 -5.042 ***
Notes.
Reported are the results from ADF tests on the
residuals of long-run equations (10). The number
of lags to include in the regression is chosen by
minimizing the Schwarz-Bayesian Information
Criterion. *** (**, *) denote rejection of the null
hypothesis that coecient 
i;2 (see equation 15) is
not statistically dierent from zero at 1% (5%, 10%)
signicance level. We employ critical values computed
by Davidson and MacKinnon [38].
41Table 14: Estimation of oil production levels. Short-run dynamics.
Algeria Ecuador Iran Kuwait Libya Saudi Arabia
C -0.001 -0.009 0.012 -0.026 -0.167 0.041
0.037 0.028 0.050 0.089 0.067 ** 0.326
lnqi;t 1 0.157 -0.190 -0.239 0.181 -0.023 0.121
0.075 ** 0.077 ** 0.084 *** 0.068 *** 0.105 0.077
lnqi;t 2 -0.005 -0.192 -0.063 -0.022
0.075 0.082 ** 0.099 0.077
lnqi;t 3 -0.068 -0.073
0.080 0.076
lnqi;t 4 -0.221
0.073 ***
lnqi;t 5
lnDt 0.232 0.488 0.600 0.478 0.119 1.085
0.099 ** 0.323 0.176 *** 0.160 *** 0.155 0.154 ***
lnDt 1 -0.012 0.088 0.304 0.234 -0.168 -0.008
0.098 0.324 0.193 0.165 0.149 0.176
lnDt 2 0.208 0.294 -0.027 0.136
0.099 ** 0.197 0.147 0.176
lnDt 3 0.311 0.231
0.189 0.174
lnDt 4 0.340
0.187 *
lnDt 5
lnPi;t -0.013 0.005 -0.003 -0.045 -0.014 -0.004
0.010 0.032 0.010 0.016 *** 0.010 0.015
lnPi;t 1 -0.005 0.066 -0.004 0.001 0.013 0.029
0.010 0.032 ** 0.010 0.018 0.011 0.015 *
lnPi;t 2 0.031 -0.007 0.020 0.035
0.010 *** 0.010 0.010 * 0.015 **
lnPi;t 3 -0.010 0.029
0.010 0.015 *
lnPi;t 4 -0.002
0.010
lnPi;t 5
ECTi;t 1 -0.153 -0.201 -0.288 -0.098
0.052 *** 0.064 *** 0.044 *** 0.036 ***
polityi;t 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.010 0.000
0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004 *** 0.001
reservesi;t 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
0.002 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.001 ** 0.001
R2 0.149 0.145 0.305 0.341 0.174 0.402
ln-likelihood 566.4 345.2 464.6 447.5 318.3 491.9
F-statistic 2.951 3.610 4.148 10.335 1.958 7.873
Prob(F-statistic) 0.002 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.047 ** 0.000 ***
Notes.
Presented are the results from the estimation of short-run dynamic of oil production
(see equations 7 to 12). For each country the nal specication is chosen according
to the algorithm presented in Section 3.2. *** (**, *) denote rejection of the null
hypothesis that the coecient is not statistically dierent from zero at 1% (5%, 10%)
signicance level. The optimal lag-length of ARDL and EC Models is chosen by
computing the autocorrelations of the estimated residuals and selecting the minimum
number of lags that ensure not serially autocorrelated error series. Dynamic models
are estimated by employing least squares techniques.
42Table 15: Estimation of oil production levels. Short-run dynamics (Ctd.)
Colombia Egypt Indonesia Malaysia Mexico Norway Russia
C 0.076 -0.017 0.005 0.004 -0.002 0.010 -0.022
0.034 ** 0.036 0.010 0.046 0.009 0.037 0.010 **
lnqi;t 1 -0.070 0.025 -0.102 -0.003 -0.487 -0.356 -0.045
0.075 0.080 0.077 0.078 0.086 *** 0.089 *** 0.090
lnqi;t 2 -0.055 -0.074 -0.377 -0.229
0.079 0.077 0.085 *** 0.078 ***
lnqi;t 3 -0.177
0.076 **
lnqi;t 4
lnqi;t 5
lnDt -0.114 -0.182 0.037 0.046 1.071 2.582 0.174
0.311 0.188 0.104 0.241 0.356 *** 0.467 *** 0.077 **
lnDt 1 0.514 -0.241 -0.040 0.199 -0.097 0.262 -0.127
0.308 * 0.184 0.101 0.237 0.366 0.499 0.074 *
lnDt 2 0.240 -0.077 0.160 0.627
0.188 0.102 0.360 0.502
lnDt 3 -0.465
0.353
lnDt 4
lnDt 5
lnPi;t 0.042 0.020 -0.007 0.001 0.022 -0.129 0.005
0.030 0.018 0.008 0.024 0.035 0.049 *** 0.007
lnPi;t 1 0.009 -0.004 0.005 0.008 -0.074 -0.007 0.002
0.030 0.018 0.008 0.024 0.035 ** 0.049 0.007
lnPi;t 2 0.038 0.012 -0.024 0.029
0.018 ** 0.008 0.035 0.048
lnPi;t 3 0.063
0.035 *
lnPi;t 4
lnPi;t 5
ECTi;t 1 -0.104 -0.134 -0.076 -0.225 -0.048
0.042 ** 0.042 *** 0.053 0.076 *** 0.031
polityi;t -0.008 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.011 0.002
0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.010 0.000
reservesi;t 0.014 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000
0.006 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.003 0.000
R2 0.070 0.107 0.045 0.075 0.335 0.432 0.140
ln-likelihood 353.2 437.6 558.5 397.7 337.4 287.6 500.0
F-statistic 1.838 1.753 0.803 1.717 5.903 11.543 2.737
Prob(F-statistic) 0.083 * 0.066 * 0.626 0.098 * 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.008 ***
Notes.
See notes to Table 14.
43Table 16: Estimation of oil production levels. Short-run dynamics (Ctd.)
Angola Nigeria Venezuela Brazil Canada U.S.
C -0.018 C 1.000 2.197 0.442 0.349 2.896
0.067 0.335 *** 0.521 *** 0.220 ** 0.234 0.509 ***
lnqi;t 1 0.183 lnqi;t 1 0.802 1.280 0.798 0.848 0.695
0.078 ** 0.076 *** 0.078 *** 0.081 *** 0.076 *** 0.053 ***
lnqi;t 2 lnqi;t 2 -0.121 -0.933 0.135 -0.159
0.098 0.124 *** 0.082 0.099
lnqi;t 3 lnqi;t 3 0.177 0.618 0.157
0.076 ** 0.134 *** 0.099
lnqi;t 4 lnqi;t 4 -0.410 0.110
0.122 *** 0.076
lnqi;t 5 lnqi;t 5 0.192
0.077 **
lnDt 0.209 lnDt 0.690 2.658 0.161 0.463 0.901
0.250 0.311 ** 0.796 *** 0.274 0.242 * 0.229 ***
lnDt 1 -0.078 lnDt 1 0.175 0.288 -0.058 0.062 0.488
0.251 0.314 0.822 0.261 0.241 0.230 **
lnDt 2 lnDt 2 0.323 -1.493 -0.116 -0.178
0.313 0.828 * 0.266 0.246
lnDt 3 lnDt 3 0.546 -0.155 -0.153
0.306 * 0.830 0.239
lnDt 4 lnDt 4 0.261 0.332
0.812 0.238
lnDt 5 lnDt 5 -0.097
0.800
lnPi;t 0.000 lnPi;t 0.001 -0.111 -0.018 -0.017 0.000
0.013 0.019 0.069 0.025 0.025 0.024
lnPi;t 1 0.001 lnPi;t 1 -0.025 0.131 -0.001 0.009 0.013
0.013 0.018 0.071 * 0.025 0.025 0.024
lnPi;t 2 lnPi;t 2 0.011 0.028 -0.020 -0.055
0.019 0.071 0.025 0.025 **
lnPi;t 3 lnPi;t 3 -0.009 -0.095 0.040
0.019 0.072 0.025
lnPi;t 4 lnPi;t 4 0.026 0.035
0.072 0.025
lnPi;t 5 lnPi;t 5 -0.079
0.069
ECTi;t 1 ECTi;t 1
polityi;t 0.001 polityi;t 0.003 -0.014 -0.001 -0.012
0.003 0.004 0.006 ** 0.007 0.003 ***
reservesi;t 0.001 reservesi;t 0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.000 -0.004
0.002 0.001 * 0.000 ** 0.004 * 0.000 0.003
R2 0.048 R2 0.827 0.790 0.990 0.953 0.762
ln-likelihood 373.4 ln-likelihood 356.7 198.5 360.2 424.8 406.3
F-statistic 1.168 F-statistic 60.198 31.727 1498.086 232.934 78.616
Prob(F-statistic) 0.324 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 ***
Notes.
See notes to Table 14.
44Table 17: Estimation of oil production levels.
Demand Prices
Country Lags F-Stat. Prob. Sign F-Stat. Prob. Sign
Algeria 2 2.85 0.04 ** (+) 3.88 0.01 ** (+)
Angola 1 0.42 0.66 0.01 0.99
Ecuador 1 1.15 0.32 2.41 0.09 *
Iran 4 3.56 0.00 *** (+) 0.36 0.87
Kuwait 1 5.00 0.01 *** (+) 4.02 0.02 ** (-)
Libya 2 0.77 0.51 2.40 0.07 * (+)
Nigeria 3 2.02 0.09 * (+) 0.64 0.64
Saudi Arabia 3 14.00 0.00 *** (+) 4.24 0.00 *** (+)
Venezuela 5 2.91 0.01 ** (+) 1.37 0.23
Brazil 2 0.25 0.86 0.43 0.73
Canada 4 1.75 0.13 1.96 0.09 * (+)
Colombia 1 1.54 0.22 1.17 0.31
Egypt 2 1.73 0.16 1.94 0.12
Indonesia 2 0.33 0.80 1.21 0.31
Malaysia 1 0.36 0.70 0.06 0.94
Mexico 3 2.79 0.03 ** (+) 2.15 0.08 * (-)
Norway 2 10.24 0.00 *** (+) 2.46 0.06 * (-)
Russia 1 4.18 0.02 ** (+) 0.40 0.67
U.S. 1 9.45 0.00 *** (+) 0.16 0.85
Notes.
Presented are the F statistic tests that all regression coecients associated with world oil
demand and real oil prices are zero. *** (**, *) indicate that: H0 : 
i;1 = 
i;2 = ::: = 
i;p = 0
and H0 : #i;1 = #i;2 = ::: = #i;p = 0 can be rejected given a 1% (5%, 10%) signicance level.
These tests are based on the estimates presented in Tables 14 to 16. In columns ve and eight
the sign of the relationship between oil production and total demand (or real oil prices) based
on long-run coecients i;D =

i;1+
i;2+:::+
i;p
1 i;1 i;2 ::: i;p and i;Pi =
#i;1+#i;2+:::+#i;p
1 i;1 i;2 ::: i;p is reported.
ARDL and EC models are estimated by employing least squares techniques. See also notes to
Table 14.
45Table 18: System Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations. First group of coun-
tries.
Q   Stat Adj Q   Stat
Lags (h) m =1 Lag 2 Lags 3 Lags m =1 Lag 2 Lags 3 Lags
1 Value 195.57 226.49 239.14 197.63 228.90 241.71
Prob 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00
2 Value 366.33 411.52 437.48 372.02 417.91 444.36
Prob 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00
3 Value 542.47 578.27 609.67 553.84 590.09 622.23
Prob 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00
4 Value 702.84 734.33 773.53 721.18 753.02 793.38
Prob 0.23 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.00
5 Value 834.70 882.49 931.44 860.29 909.41 960.15
Prob 0.59 0.18 0.02 0.35 0.06 0.00
6 Value 1019.36 1082.85 1136.07 1057.27 1123.27 1178.73
Prob 0.45 0.07 0.00 0.17 0.01 0.00
Notes. The rst group of countries comprises Algeria, Ecuador, Iran, Kuwait, Libya,
Saudi Arabia, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Norway and Russia.
The null hypothesis considered by the multivariate Box-Pierce/Ljung-Box Q-statistics
is that there is no residual autocorrelations up to lag h. Notice that the test is valid only
for h larger than the lag order of the system (m = 1; 2; 3).
46Table 19: System Residual Portmanteau Tests for Autocorrelations. Second group of
countries.
Q   Stat Adj Q   Stat
Lags (h) m =1 Lag 2 Lags 3 Lags m =1 Lag 2 Lags 3 Lags
1 Value 47.67 31.14 24.62 47.96 31.33 24.78
Prob 0.00 0.18 0.48 0.00 0.18 0.48
2 Value 85.94 72.93 46.99 86.71 73.64 47.43
Prob 0.00 0.02 0.59 0.00 0.02 0.58
3 Value 127.08 107.49 82.28 128.62 108.85 83.37
Prob 0.00 0.01 0.26 0.00 0.01 0.24
4 Value 146.71 127.99 106.37 148.73 129.87 108.08
Prob 0.00 0.03 0.31 0.00 0.02 0.27
5 Value 157.88 138.49 120.71 160.26 140.70 122.88
Prob 0.02 0.19 0.59 0.02 0.16 0.54
6 Value 191.62 169.60 147.54 195.28 173.00 150.74
Prob 0.01 0.13 0.54 0.01 0.10 0.47
Notes. The second group of countries comprises Nigeria, Venezuela, Brazil, Canada
and the U.S.. See also notes to Table 18.
47Table 20: Estimation of Dynamic SURs. Results on the statistical signicance of world
oil demand and prices.
Demand Prices
Country Lags 2(2) Prob. Sign 2(2) Prob. Sign
Algeria 1 6.26 0.04 ** (+) 1.94 0.38
Ecuador 1 8.88 0.01 ** (+) 2.27 0.32
Iran 1 31.48 0.00 *** (+) 4.32 0.12
Kuwait 1 23.25 0.00 *** (+) 9.49 0.01 *** (-)
Libya 1 3.57 0.17 1.18 0.55
Saudi Arabia 1 69.61 0.00 *** (+) 12.80 0.00 *** (+)
Colombia 1 3.11 0.21 1.91 0.39
Egypt 1 8.07 0.02 ** (+) 1.47 0.48
Indonesia 1 0.33 0.85 1.31 0.52
Malaysia 1 0.74 0.69 1.21 0.55
Mexico 1 5.58 0.06 * (+) 6.21 0.04 ** (-)
Norway 1 36.74 0.00 *** (+) 9.90 0.01 *** (-)
Russia 1 11.03 0.00 *** (+) 1.03 0.60
Nigeria 3 8.87 0.06 * (+) 2.70 0.61
Venezuela 3 19.48 0.00 *** (+) 6.68 0.15
Brazil 3 1.31 0.86 2.63 0.62
Canada 3 5.91 0.21 7.82 0.10 * (+)
U.S. 3 23.29 0.00 *** (+) 6.85 0.14
Notes.
Presented are the statistic tests that all regression coecients associated with world oil
demand and oil prices are zero. *** (**, *) indicate that: H0 : 
i;1 = 
i;2 = ::: = 
i;p = 0
and H0 : #i;1 = #i;2 = ::: = #i;p = 0 can be rejected given a 1% (5%, 10%) signicance level.
Dynamic models are estimated by employing Seemingly Unrelated Regression techniques.
In columns ve and eight the sign of the relationship between oil production and total
demand (or real oil prices) based on long-run coecients i;D =

i;1+
i;2+:::+
i;p
1 i;1 i;2 ::: i;p
and i;Pi =
#i;1+#i;2+:::+#i;p
1 i;1 i;2 ::: i;p is reported.
48Table 21: Models employed to test asymmetric eects of exogenous variables on oil pro-
duction levels.
Model Symmetric Eects
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49Table 22: Asymmetric eects of world oil demand on oil production.
lnD
(+)
t lnD
( )
t
Country Lags F-Stat. Prob. (Sign) F-Stat. Prob. (Sign)
Algeria 2 2.28 0.08 * (+) 0.77 0.51
Angola 6 0.66 0.70 0.80 0.59
Ecuador 1 0.10 0.90 0.69 0.50
Iran 3 0.68 0.61 1.32 0.26
Kuwait 1 1.40 0.25 1.17 0.31
Libya 2 0.43 0.73 1.68 0.18
Nigeria 1 0.32 0.73 1.35 0.26
Saudi Arabia 1 13.53 0.00 *** (+) 3.23 0.04 ** (+)
Venezuela 5 1.16 0.33 3.37 0.00 *** (+)
Brazil 2 1.59 0.19 0.91 0.44
Canada 4 0.26 0.93 0.65 0.66
Colombia 1 2.66 0.07 * (+) 1.60 0.21
Egypt 4 0.37 0.87 0.76 0.58
Indonesia 1 1.03 0.36 1.06 0.35
Malaysia 1 0.63 0.53 0.39 0.68
Mexico 2 1.84 0.14 0.34 0.79
Norway 2 4.51 0.00 *** (+) 2.58 0.06 * (+)
Russia 1 2.33 0.10 1.98 0.14
U.S. 2 0.11 0.95 8.75 0.00 *** (+)
Notes.
Presented are the F statistic tests that all regression coecients associated with world
oil demand increases and decreases are zero. *** (**, *) indicate that the null hypotheses
H0 : 

(+)
i;1 = 

(+)
i;2 = ::: = 

(+)
i;p = 0 and H0 : 

( )
i;1 = 

( )
i;2 = ::: = 

( )
i;p = 0 are rejected given
a 1% (5%, 10%) signicance level. The optimal lag-length of ARDL and EC Models is chosen
by computing the autocorrelations of the estimated residuals and selecting the minimum
number of lags that ensure not serially autocorrelated error series. Dynamic models are
estimated by employing least squares techniques.
50Table 23: Asymmetric eects of real oil prices on oil production.
lnP
(+)
i;t lnP
( )
i;t
Country Lags F-Stat. Prob. (Sign) F-Stat. Prob. (Sign)
Algeria 2 0.41 0.75 2.91 0.04 ** (+)
Angola 6 - - - -
Ecuador 1 0.26 0.77 1.20 0.30
Iran 3 0.10 0.98 0.97 0.42
Kuwait 1 2.06 0.13 0.55 0.58
Libya 2 2.24 0.09 * (+) 3.16 0.03 ** (+)
Nigeria 1 1.01 0.37 0.19 0.82
Saudi Arabia 1 0.89 0.41 1.02 0.36
Venezuela 5 0.27 0.95 1.38 0.23
Brazil 2 0.58 0.63 1.66 0.18
Canada 4 1.89 0.10 * (+) 0.48 0.79
Colombia 1 0.20 0.82 2.56 0.08 * (+)
Egypt 4 0.18 0.97 0.66 0.66
Indonesia 1 0.65 0.52 2.58 0.08 * (-)
Malaysia 1 0.61 0.55 0.94 0.39
Mexico 2 1.02 0.39 0.45 0.72
Norway 2 1.02 0.39 1.49 0.22
Russia 1 0.20 0.82 0.40 0.67
U.S. 2 1.86 0.14 4.02 0.01 *** (-)
Notes.
Presented are the F statistic tests that all regression coecients associated with real
oil price increases and decreases are zero. *** (**, *) indicate that the null hypotheses
H0 : #
(+)
i;1 = #
(+)
i;2 = ::: = #
(+)
i;p = 0 and H0 : #
( )
i;1 = #
( )
i;2 = ::: = #
( )
i;p = 0 is rejected
given a 1% (5%, 10%) signicance level. See also notes to Table 22.
51Table 24: Asymmetric eects of world oil demand and real oil prices on oil production.


(+)
i = #
(+)
i =
Country 

( )
i Prob. #
( )
i Prob.
Algeria 2.18 0.14 0.15 0.69
Angola 0.10 0.75 - -
Ecuador 0.39 0.53 0.28 0.60
Iran 0.04 0.85 0.77 0.38
Kuwait 0.00 0.99 1.34 0.25
Libya 4.42 0.04 ** 5.52 0.02 **
Nigeria 0.91 0.34 0.26 0.61
Saudi Arabia 3.35 0.07 * 0.07 0.80
Venezuela 0.08 0.78 0.04 0.85
Brazil 0.08 0.78 3.20 0.08 *
Canada 0.07 0.79 0.07 0.80
Colombia 4.16 0.04 ** 1.33 0.25
Egypt 0.28 0.60 0.18 0.67
Indonesia 2.58 0.11 1.94 0.17
Malaysia 0.90 0.35 1.56 0.21
Mexico 0.44 0.51 0.15 0.70
Norway 0.03 0.86 1.59 0.21
Russia 3.65 0.06 * 0.02 0.88
U.S. 3.87 0.05 * 5.59 0.02 **
Notes.
In columns two and three the results of F-test over the null
hypothesis that:
P
j 

(+)
i;j =
P
j 

( )
i;j are presented. In columns
four and ve we report the results of F-test over the null
hypothesis that:
P
s #
(+)
i;s =
P
s #
( )
i;s .
52Table 25: Asymmetric eects of world oil demand on oil production. Estimation of dy-
namic SURs.
lnD
(+)
t lnD
( )
t
Country Lags F-Stat. Prob. (Sign) F-Stat. Prob. (Sign)
Algeria 1 6.56 0.04 ** (+) 0.56 0.76
Ecuador 1 0.23 0.89 1.02 0.60
Iran 1 1.07 0.59 6.70 0.04 ** (+)
Kuwait 1 5.99 0.05 * (+) 3.58 0.17
Libya 1 1.70 0.43 2.79 0.25
Saudi Arabia 1 38.54 0.00 *** (+) 4.88 0.09 * (+)
Colombia 1 6.24 0.04 ** (+) 3.26 0.20
Egypt 1 1.83 0.40 0.58 0.75
Indonesia 1 2.20 0.33 1.85 0.40
Malaysia 1 0.95 0.62 0.99 0.61
Mexico 1 6.76 0.03 ** (+) 0.08 0.96
Norway 1 15.06 0.00 *** (+) 5.17 0.08 * (+)
Russia 1 4.13 0.13 3.43 0.18
Nigeria 3 2.65 0.62 6.36 0.17
Venezuela 3 1.64 0.80 20.57 0.00 *** (+)
Brazil 3 6.15 0.19 3.19 0.53
Canada 3 1.08 0.90 3.10 0.54
U.S. 3 3.41 0.49 25.94 0.00 *** (+)
Notes. Presented are the F statistic tests that all regression coecients associated with
world oil demand increases and decreases are zero. Dynamic models are estimated by
employing Seemingly Unrelated Regression techniques. *** (**, *) indicate that the null
hypotheses H0 : 

(+)
i;1 = 

(+)
i;2 = ::: = 

(+)
i;p = 0 and H0 : 

( )
i;1 = 

( )
i;2 = ::: = 

( )
i;p = 0
are rejected given a 1% (5%, 10%) signicance level. The number of lags to include in the
system of equations is chosen by considering the Box-Pierce/Ljung-Box adjusted Q-statistics.
The minimum lag length that ensures not serially autocorrelated residuals is selected.
53Table 26: Asymmetric eects of real oil prices on oil production. Estimation of dynamic
SURs.
lnP
(+)
i;t lnP
( )
i;t
Country Lags F-Stat. Prob. (Sign) F-Stat. Prob. (Sign)
Algeria 1 0.67 0.72 1.97 0.37
Ecuador 1 1.09 0.58 1.83 0.40
Iran 1 0.31 0.86 0.22 0.90
Kuwait 1 4.14 0.13 1.27 0.53
Libya 1 5.79 0.06 * (-) 4.94 0.08 * (+)
Saudi Arabia 1 2.61 0.27 1.91 0.38
Colombia 1 0.87 0.65 3.04 0.22
Egypt 1 0.24 0.89 0.85 0.65
Indonesia 1 0.52 0.77 3.18 0.20
Malaysia 1 1.32 0.52 1.40 0.50
Mexico 1 3.90 0.14 0.20 0.91
Norway 1 3.11 0.21 2.14 0.34
Russia 1 0.33 0.85 0.63 0.73
Nigeria 3 5.16 0.27 2.92 0.57
Venezuela 3 4.07 0.40 5.17 0.27
Brazil 3 2.06 0.72 7.65 0.11
Canada 3 9.53 0.05 ** (-) 2.29 0.68
U.S. 3 8.47 0.08 * (+) 13.08 0.01 ** (-)
Notes. Presented are the F statistic tests that all regression coecients associated with
real oil price increases and decreases are zero. Dynamic models are estimated by
employing Seemingly Unrelated Regression techniques. *** (**, *) indicate that the null
hypotheses H0 : #
(+)
i;1 = #
(+)
i;2 = ::: = #
(+)
i;p = 0 and H0 : #
( )
i;1 = #
( )
i;2 = ::: = #
( )
i;p = 0
are rejected given a 1% (5%, 10%) signicance level. See also notes to Table 25.
54Table 27: Asymmetric eects of world oil demand and real oil prices on oil production.
Estimation of dynamic SURs.


(+)
i = #
(+)
i =
Country 

( )
i Prob. #
( )
i Prob.
Algeria 2.04 0.15 1.31 0.25
Ecuador 0.39 0.53 0.06 0.81
Iran 0.01 0.93 0.00 0.96
Kuwait 0.01 0.91 1.45 0.23
Libya 2.50 0.11 4.13 0.04 **
Saudi Arabia 5.06 0.02 ** 0.02 0.89
Colombia 4.79 0.03 ** 0.46 0.50
Egypt 0.03 0.87 0.14 0.71
Indonesia 2.35 0.13 1.28 0.26
Malaysia 0.71 0.40 1.31 0.25
Mexico 0.33 0.57 0.29 0.59
Norway 0.07 0.79 1.18 0.28
Russia 3.11 0.08 * 0.01 0.91
Nigeria 0.39 0.53 0.74 0.39
Venezuela 4.11 0.04 ** 0.10 0.75
Brazil 0.43 0.51 1.78 0.18
Canada 0.02 0.89 0.11 0.74
U.S. 1.22 0.27 4.35 0.04 **
Notes.
In columns two and three (resp. four and ve) we report the
results of F-tests over the null hypothesis that the sums of
positive and negative coecients on world oil demand (resp.
real oil prices) are equal. Dynamic models are estimated by
employing Seemingly Unrelated Regressions techniques.
55Table 28: Estimation of asymmetric Error Correction Models for oil production.
ECT
(+)
i;t 1 ECT
( )
i;t 1
Country F-Stat. Prob. (Sign) F-Stat. Prob. (Sign)
Ecuador 1.65 0.20 18.40 0.00 ***
Iran 12.85 0.00 *** 0.14 0.71
Kuwait 11.03 0.00 *** 9.96 0.00 ***
Saudi Arabia 5.30 0.02 ** 2.29 0.13
Egypt 1.22 0.27 0.90 0.35
Malaysia 0.03 0.86 12.24 0.00 ***
Mexico 0.01 0.94 2.78 0.10 *
Norway 0.17 0.68 10.13 0.00 ***
Russia 1.36 0.25 0.19 0.67
Country 
(+)
i = 
( )
i Prob.
Ecuador 9.96 0.00 ***
Iran 5.00 0.03 **
Kuwait 0.05 0.82
Saudi Arabia 0.21 0.65
Egypt 0.02 0.90
Malaysia 4.55 0.03 **
Mexico 0.85 0.36
Norway 3.33 0.07 *
Russia 0.22 0.64
Notes.
Reported are the F statistics for the null hypothesis that equilibrium adjustment
parameters associated to positive and negative components of the long-run
equilibrium relationship are zero. *** (**, *) indicate that the null hypotheses
H0 : 
(+)
i = 0 and H0 : 
( )
i = 0 are rejected given a 1% (5%, 10%) signicance
level. Columns seven and eight present the results of F-test over the hypothesis
that: H0 : 
(+)
i = 
( )
i . Dynamic models are estimated by employing least squares
techniques.
56Table 29: Asymmetric Error Correction Models for oil production. Estimation of dynamic
SURs.
ECT
(+)
i;t 1 ECT
( )
i;t 1
Country F-Stat. Prob. (Sign) F-Stat. Prob. (Sign)
Ecuador 1.91 0.17 23.97 0.00 ***
Iran 28.09 0.00 *** 0.01 0.91
Kuwait 7.10 0.01 *** 8.42 0.00 ***
Saudi Arabia 3.26 0.07 * 1.02 0.31
Egypt 3.74 0.05 * 0.44 0.50
Malaysia 0.06 0.81 3.98 0.05 **
Mexico 0.08 0.78 7.82 0.01 ***
Norway 0.00 0.99 15.64 0.00 ***
Russia 0.68 0.41 0.51 0.48
Country 
(+)
i = 
( )
i Prob.
Ecuador 13.47 0.00 ***
Iran 11.84 0.00 ***
Kuwait 0.05 0.83
Saudi Arabia 0.10 0.75
Egypt 0.80 0.37
Malaysia 3.50 0.06 *
Mexico 3.59 0.06 *
Norway 10.65 0.00 ***
Russia 0.01 0.90
Notes.
Reported are the F statistics for the null hypothesis that equilibrium adjustment
parameters associated to positive and negative components of the long-run
equilibrium relationship are zero. *** (**, *) indicate that the null hypotheses
H0 : 
(+)
i = 0 and H0 : 
( )
i = 0 are rejected given a 1% (5%, 10%) signicance
level. Columns seven and eight present the results of F-test over the hypothesis
that: H0 : 
(+)
i = 
( )
i . Dynamic models are estimated by employing SUR techniques.
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